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Abstract
This paper gives an overview of SC(R)3 – a
toolset designed to increase the usability of for-
mal methods for software development. For-
mal requirements are specified in SC(R)3 in an
easy to use and review format, and then used
in checking requirements for correctness and in
verifying consistency between annotated code
and requirements.
In this paper we discuss motivations behind
this work, describe several tools which are part
of SC(R)3, and illustrate their operation on an
example of a Cruise Control system.
1 Introduction
Researchers have long been advocating us-
ing mathematically-precise (“formal”) specifi-
cations in software projects [21]. These spec-
ifications aid in removing errors early in the
software lifecycle and can be reused in a vari-
ety of ways: as a reference point during system
design and during development of test cases, as
documentation during maintenance, etc. How-
ever, there is a strong resistance against adopt-
ing formal methods in practice, especially out-
side the domain of safety-critical systems. The
primary reason for this resistance is the percep-
tion of software developers regarding the appli-
cability of formal methods – these methods are
considered to be hard (require a level of math-
ematical sophistication beyond that possessed
by many software developers), expensive, and
not relevant for “real” software systems [9]. Al-
though case-studies (e.g. [7]) have shown ap-
plicability and effectiveness of formal methods
for various industrial-size systems, this percep-
tion still remains. Currently, most research
in formal methods concentrates on improving
modeling languages and tool support to be able
to specify and verify larger and more complex
problems (e.g. [13, 16]). However, to facilitate
a wide-spread use of formal methods, another,
complimentary approach is necessary: to im-
prove usability of the methods and the tools and
to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of apply-
ing them to software systems. We believe that
the way to make formal methods more usable
is by
• amortizing the cost of creating formal doc-
umentation throughout the software life-
cycle, i.e. using this documentation for
checking correctness of programs, generat-
ing test cases and test environments, etc.;
• using (or developing) easy to read and re-
view notations (e.g., state-machines and
tables);
• decreasing analysis cost through automa-
tion; and
• adopting existing technologies wherever
possible.
We are interested in specifying and verifying
event-driven systems, and chose SCR (Software
Cost Reduction) to be the requirements nota-
tion used in our project.
The SCR requirements notation was devel-
oped by a research group at the Naval Research
Laboratory as part of the Software Cost Reduc-
tion project [11, 12]. This notation specifies
event-driven systems as communicating state
machines which move between states as the
environment changes. The functional part of
the system requirements describes the values of
the system’s output variables as a function of
the system’s input (event) and internal state.
These requirements can be formally specified
by providing structured decision tables. For
each output variable, there is a table which
specifies how to compute the variable’s value
based on its previous value and input events.
Representing logical formulae using tables
is a powerful way to visualize information
which gained acceptance among many practi-
tioners. Table structure makes specifications
easy to write and review and allows for high-
yield mechanical analysis. Tools were devel-
oped to check mode tables of SCR for cor-
rectness with respect to global properties using
model-checking [24] and theorem-proving [19].
A group at the Naval Research Lab developed
an industrial-quality tool called SCR* which al-
lows specifying and reasoning about complex
systems using SCR [10]. SCR* performs checks
to ensure that the tables are complete and con-
sistent. Tool-building is not limited to the
SCR community. For example, David Par-
nas and his colleagues are working on meth-
ods and tools to document programs using ta-
bles [22, 20, 23, 1], and a group at Odyssey
Research Associates are developing Tablewise
- a tool to reason about decision tables [14].
However, none of these tools are aimed at us-
ing tabular requirements once they have been
created.
During the past several years, we have been
developing a number of tools that use SCR
requirements throughout the various stages
of software lifecycle, and have recently in-
tegrated them into a toolset called SC(R)3
which stands for the SCR Requirements Reuse.
SC(R)3 allows users to specify their require-
ments through a visual interface, conducts sim-
ple syntactical checks, and invokes various tools
to perform analysis of software artifacts. We
have developed tools to check requirements for
correctness and to verify consistency between
annotated code and requirements, and will de-
scribe these activities using the Cruise Control
system – a case study that we recently under-
took.
The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 describes requirements of the
Cruise Control system. Sections 3 and 4 out-
line techniques to analyze the consistency of the
requirements and the correspondence between
the code and the requirements, respectively. In
Section 5 we summarize our work and outline
future research directions.
2 Requirements of Cruise
Control System
A Cruise Control system specified by Jim
Kirby [15] is responsible for keeping an automo-
bile traveling at a certain speed. The driver ac-
celerates to the desired speed and then presses
a button on the steering wheel to activate the
cruise control. The cruise control then main-
tains the car’s speed, remaining active until one
of the following events occurs: (1) the driver
presses the brake pedal; (2) the driver presses
the gas pedal; (3) the car’s speed becomes un-
controllable; (4) the engine stops running; (5)
the driver turns the ignition off; (6) the driver
turns the cruise control off. If any of the first
three events listed above occur, the driver can
re-activate the cruise control system at the pre-
viously set speed by pressing a ‘resume’ button.
Table 1 gives an overview of the different
sections of an SC(R)3 requirements specifica-
tion. SC(R)3 uses a simplified SCR method in
which monitored and controlled variables have
just boolean values (representing predicates on
inputs and outputs), and results of intermedi-
ate computations (so called “terms”) are not
used. Monitored variables in our case study
indicate the state of the ignition, brake, and
acceleration, the buttons operating the cruise
control system, and the speed of the car. Ta-
ble 2 shows some monitored variables and the
1The value of THRESHOLD is not specified in [15].
That document suggests to use a “value chosen ac-
cording to how wide a speed variation is regarded as
acceptable.”
Component Description
monitored variables quantities that influence the system behaviour
mode classes sets of states (called modes) that partition the monitored
environment’s state space
controlled variables quantities that the system regulates
assumptions assumed properties of the environment
goals properties that are required to hold in the system
Table 1: Components of a requirements specification in the SC(R)3 notation.
Current New
Mode Ignition Running Toofast Brake Accel b Cruise b Resume b Off Mode
Off @T – – – – – – – Inactive
Inactive @F – – – – – – – Off
– t f f f @T – – Cruise
Cruise @F – – – – – – – Off
– – @T – – – – – Inactive
– @F – – – – – – Inactive
– – – @T – – – – Override
– – – – @T – – – Override
– – – – – – – @T Override
Override @F – – – – – – – Off
– @F – – – – – – Inactive
– – f f f – @T – Cruise
– – f f f @T – – Cruise
Initial Mode: Off (∼Ignition)
Table 4: Mode transition table for mode class CC of the cruise control system.
predicates they represent.
The Cruise Control system has one mode
class CC, whose modes are described in Ta-
ble 3. The system is in exactly one mode of
each modeclass at all times, so we can think
of modeclasses as finite-state machines. The
mode transition table of mode class CC is shown
in Table 4. Each row of the table specifies
an event that activates a transition from the
mode on the left to the mode on the right.
The system starts in mode Off if Ignition is
false, and transitions to mode Inactive when
Ignition becomes true, i.e., has a value false in
the current state and a value true in the next,
indicated by “@T” in the mode transition ta-
ble. Once in mode Inactive, the system re-
mains there until Ignition becomes false (in-
dicated by “@F”), at which point it switches
to mode Off. The system also transitions from
Inactive to Cruise if b Cruise becomes true
while Running is true (indicated by “t”), and
Toofast, Brake, Accel are false (indicated by
“f”). Values of monitored variables indicated
by “–” are not relevant to that particular tran-
sition, e.g., a variable Brake in the transition
from Off to Inactive. An SCR specification
defines one mode transition table for each mode
class of the system. Such tables are entered
into SC(R)3 using a mode class editor shown
in Figure 1.
The Cruise Control system has a number of
controlled variables to control the car throttle
and display messages when the car is due for
service or when it needs more oil. For exam-
ple, a variable ThrottleAccel is true when the
throttle is in the accelerating position and false
Figure 1: SC(R)3 mode class editor.
otherwise. The condition table for this variable
is shown in Table 5. ThrottleAccel is only
evaluated in mode Cruise. The first row of
the table specifies that ThrottleAccel should
become true when the speed is too slow, and
false when the system exits the mode Cruise
(indicated as @F(Inmode)). When the system
enters Cruise because the user pressed the re-
sume button, the cruise control needs to main-
tain the previously set speed. Thus, the current
speed is immediately evaluated, and if it is too
slow, ThrottleAccel should become true, as
indicated in the second row of the table. An
SCR specification defines one table for each
controlled variable of the system. The SC(R)3
module for specifying these variables is shown
in Figure 2.
SC(R)3 allows to record assumptions of the
requirements about the behavior of the envi-
ronment. Assumptions specify constraints on
the values of conditions, imposed by laws of
nature or by other mode classes in the sys-
tem. In particular, we can assume that the
engine is running only if the ignition is on
(Running --≫ Ignition), the car can be go-
ing “too fast” only if it is running (Toofast
--≫ Running), and various boolean condi-
tions are related by enumeration. The later cat-
Figure 2: SC(R)3 controlled variable editor.
Mode True False
Cruise @T(speed slow) @F(Inmode)
Cruise @T(Inmode) WHEN [b Resume & speed slow] @F(speed slow)
Initial: False
Table 5: Event table for the controlled variable ThrottleAccel.
Variable Description
Ignition ignition is on
Running engine is running
Toofast Sp Vehicle > MAX SPEED
Brake brake pedal is being pressed
Accel gas pedal is being pressed
b Cruise cruise button is being pressed
b Resume resume button is being pressed
b Off off button is being pressed
speed slow Sp Vehicle < Sp Desired -
THRESHOLD1
Table 2: Select Cruise Control monitored vari-
ables.
egory includes predicates on the vehicle’s speed
(speed slow / speed ok / speed fast) and
buttons controlling the cruise control system
(b Off / b Cruise / b Resume).
The last section of requirements specification
consists of the system goals. These are not con-
Mode Description
Off vehicle’s ignition is off
Inactive vehicle’s ignition is on, but the
cruise control is not on
Cruise the cruise control is on and can
control the vehicle’s speed
Override the cruise control is on but cannot
control the vehicle’s speed
Table 3: Modes of the mode class CC.
straints on the system behaviour but rather pu-
tative theorems – global properties that should
hold in the system under specification, e.g.
“the light will eventually become green”, or
“reversing a list twice gives us the original list”.
The language for specifying these properties in
SC(R)3 is an extension of CTL (Computational
Tree Logic). CTL is a branching-time temporal
logic [6] which allows quantification over some
or all possible futures. CTL formulae are de-
fined recursively: all propositional formulae are
in CTL; if f and g are in CTL, so are ∼f (nega-
tion), f & g (conjunction), and f | g (disjunc-
tion). Furthermore, the universal (A) and the
existential (E) quantifiers are used alongside
the “next state” (X), “until” (U), “future” (F )
and “global” (G) operators. Thus, the formula
AG(f → g)
means that it is invariantly true that f implies
g.
In addition to propositional formulae, our
language allows to express properties involving
SCR events, e.g.
[Property 1] If the system is in
mode Override, then it will react to
the event @F(Ignition) by immedi-
ately going to the mode Off.
The semantics of events @T(a) (@F(a)) is that
a is true (false) in the current state and false
(true) in the previous. To ease the phrasing of
CTL formulas that refer to the occurrence of
conditioned events, we use unary logic connec-
tives @T and @F to express the SCR notions
of becoming true and becoming false.
Typically, the properties we are interested in
specifying include invariants, reachability prop-
erties – these are important to ensure that the
invariant properties are not true vacuously, and
“progress” (bounded liveness) properties. For
example, some of the invariant properties of the
Cruise Control system is “whenever the system
is in mode Override of modeclass CC, the sys-
tem is running and the ignition is on”, formal-
ized as
AG(CC = Override→ (Ignition & Running))
and “predicates representing the state of the
Throttle are related by enumeration”, formal-
ized as
AG(ThrottleOff | ThrottleMaintain
| ThrottleAccel | ThrottleDecel)
“Progress” properties are used to check that
the system behaves according to our expecta-
tions. For example, one of the “progress” prop-
erties of the Cruise Control system is Property
1 given above, formalized as
AG(CC = Cruise→
AX(@F (Ignition)→ CC = Off))
Note that in this property we use a logical
connective @F.
3 Checking Consistency of
Requirements
Counter-examples SCR Specification
and CTL properties
gensmvSMV
SMV Input Language
Editor
Requirements3SC(R)
Figure 3: Requirements analysis with SC(R)3.
System goals allow semantical checks on re-
quirements, i.e. checks that these goals hold in
the specification of the system. We chose to
use model-checking [6] to perform these checks.
A symbolic model-checker SMV developed by
McMillan [17], uses state exploration to check
if temporal properties hold in a finite-state
model. However, we first needed to translate
the behavioral specifications of SCR into a for-
mat accepted by SMV, which is done using a
tool gensmv. The requirements analysis pro-
cess is depicted in Figure 3, where tools and
artifacts are represented by ellipses and boxes,
respectively. In this section, we briefly de-
scribe gensmv, outline counter-example facili-
ties of SMV and SC(R)3, and present results of
verification of the Cruise Control system.
3.1 Translating SCR Specifica-
tions
gensmv [24] was developed at the University
of Waterloo to reason about mode transi-
tion tables. Before translating SCR specifica-
tions, gensmv details the mode transition tables
with information derived from environmental
assumptions. For example, an assumption
Running --≫ Ignition adds information to
the second transition from mode Inactive to
mode Cruise (third row of Table 4): if Running
is true, then Ignition should already be true.
Detailed SCR tables are translated into the
SMV input language. In order to translate added
logic connectives @T and @F to regular CTL,
accepted by SMV, gensmv needs to store pre-
vious values of variables which can occur in
events. This is facilitated by introducing addi-
tional variables in the SMVmodel. For example,
in order to reason about a property involving
@F(Ignition), we need an additional variable
PIgnition, which is assigned the current value
of Ignition before the next value of this vari-
able is computed. Thus, Property 1 is trans-
lated into CTL as
AG(CC = Cruise→ AX((PIgnition &
∼ Ignition)→ CC = Off))
We extended gensmv to translate condition ta-
bles of controlled variables into the SMV mod-
eling language [4]. This way, we are able to
reason about the entire SC(R)3 specification.
3.2 Counter-examples
During verification of CTL properties, SMV ex-
plores all possible behaviors of the model and
either declares that the property holds or gives
a counter-example. Since we wanted to make
calls to SMV completely transparent to the user,
and because of the introduction of extra vari-
ables into the SMV model, we found it neces-
sary to automatically capture SMV’s counter-
examples and translate them into the SCR for-
mat. This translation allows the user to easily
determine where errors occur, without having
to understand the intricacies of translation be-
tween the SCR and the SMV models.
For example, if we try to check the property
“pressing the Cruise button at any point when
Figure 4: A counter-example generated during
the requirements analysis.
the system is running will turn the cruise con-
trol system on”, formalized as
AG((Running & @T (b Cruise))
→ AF (CC = Cruise))
SC(R)3 reports a scenario that would violate
this property, shown in Figure 4. Thus, the
system does not react to changes in b Cruise
if the car is running too fast to be controlled
by the automatic system.
3.3 Checking the Cruise Control
System
We were successfully able to model and ver-
ify the automobile cruise control system using
the SC(R)3 toolset. The verification was per-
formed on a moderately loaded SPARCstation-
20 (2 75 MHz processors) with 256 megabytes
of RAM using SMV version 2.4. The complete
Cruise Control specification consists of 22 mon-
itored and 13 controlled variables, translated
into 47 SMV variables. Given that the size of
the model grows exponentially to the number of
variables in the system, we were not surprised
that the initial runs of SMV did not complete
after two days. However, we explored various
Test User time System time BDD nodes Total number of vars
Full specification
-reorder 26487.25s 420.31s 34315278 47
Throttle properties
Base 5.67s 0.2s 112687 26
-f -inc 11.06s 0.07s 18714 26
-reorder 5.69s 0.15s 75356 26
-f -inc -reorder 12.28s 0.1s 18630 26
All but throttle
Base 8102.76s 50.59s 9780674 43
-f -inc 18783.8s 263.46s 3406360 43
-reorder 4237.56s 7.37s 4425504 43
-f -inc -reorder 13599.5s 12.54s 3406360 43
Table 6: Verification of the Cruise Control specification: experimental results.
ways to reduce the time and memory require-
ments necessary to verify the system. The fol-
lowing is the summary of our findings.
• The most effective technique is “slicing”, i.e.,
removing variables that are not used in proper-
ties under verification. Currently, if a variable
does not appear in any of the properties and
no other variables depend on it, SMV still in-
cludes it into the models it builds. However,
it is safe to remove such variables from con-
sideration, thus greatly reducing sizes of the
models. In SCR, there is a hierarchy of depen-
dencies between requirements’ variables, which
is very easy to compute and take advantage of,
although at the expense of producing separate
SMV models. In SC(R)3, the later process can
only be done by hand so far, although we are
developing an automatic model generation.
• Another technique is turning the variable re-
ordering on. SMV uses binary decision diagrams
(BDDs) to quickly manipulate logical expres-
sions. Unfortunately, the size of the BDDs is
extremely sensitive to the order of the vari-
ables used to build them [24]. SMV has an op-
tion2--reorder that allows it to heuristically
compute and use a “better” variable reorder-
ing which is typically very effective. However,
even with reordering turned on, SMV took a
long time to verify the Cruise Control speci-
fication (26487.25 seconds of user time). To
overcome this problem, we split the model into
2Version 2.5 of SMV uses variable reordering by
default.
two: mode classes and controlled variables re-
lated to the throttle, and mode classes and all
other controlled variables. Results of our ex-
periments appear in Table 6. In this table, we
list the user and the system time in seconds,
and the total number of BDD nodes used dur-
ing the verification, as reported by SMV. The
last column of the table is the number of vari-
ables in the SMV model. We were unable to
measure the running time in terms of real time,
since SMV does not keep this information.
• Amore controversial technique is building the
state space incrementally, removing unreach-
able parts of the model (SMV options --f and
---inc). This technique reduces the size of
BDDs at the expense of the longer running
time. Combining this option with --reorder
typically yields a smaller number of BDD nodes
than either of the options alone, but the veri-
fication time is slightly worse than by running
SMV with with --reorder alone (see Table 6).
We feel that both options should be turned
on on a fast machine with a limited amount
of memory, whereas just --reorder should be
turned on on a slower machine.
The verification effort yielded a number of
errors, most of which could be traced back to
the original specification [15]. We found no er-
rors in the mode transition table because this
table has been analyzed earlier by Atlee and
her colleagues [2]3. However, we did find er-
3However, our study showed that a number of con-
Throttle Setting
Mode Condition
Cruise speed slow speed ok & speed fast & Accel &
∼Accel ∼Accel ∼ speed slow
Throttle Accel Maintain Decel Off
Table 7: Condition table for variable Throttle.
rors in controlled variable tables of the origi-
nal specification. For example, the cruise con-
trol system includes a controlled variable OilOn
which represents lighting up an indicator when
the vehicle is due for an oil change, i.e., it
has traveled a certain distance since its pre-
vious oil change. In Kirby’s specification, this
controlled variable is evaluated when we enter
any mode other than Off (@T(Inmode) when
Omiles low). Thus, the vehicle could be trav-
eling with the cruise control system turned off,
not changing its modes and never setting OilOn
to true. We modified the table for OilOn to set
the variable to true when Omiles low becomes
true, regardless of the mode.
Another problem was found in the table for
evaluating the throttle. In the notation used by
Kirby, Throttle was an enumerated variable
whose values are evaluated in mode Cruise as
specified in Table 7. We found that condition
∼Accel is redundant – the system exits mode
Cruise as soon as Accel becomes true. We also
suspected that the throttle might never become
Off. To check that, we modeled the variable
Throttle in SMV and ran it against the prop-
erty
∼ Throttle = Off→ AG(∼ Throttle = Off)
which was verified, confirming our suspicion.
Finally, the correctness of the specification is
conditional upon the time when the predicate
on the vehicle’s speed is evaluated. It works
correctly only when speed ok, speed slow and
speed fast get evaluated before the system
transitions into mode Cruise.
ditions used in Atlee’s specification were not neces-
sary, e.g., specifying that transitions from Override to
Cruise occur only when Running and Ignition are true.
These conditions are implied by other transitions in the
mode table and did not need to be specified explicitly.
4 Checking Correctness of
Code
At some point in the future it will be possible
to generate code from the black-box require-
ments specified in SCR. However, this code
will likely require some hand-tuning, e.g., be-
cause it is too slow, or might even have to be
rewritten from scratch. Mathematically pre-
cise software requirements, like SCR, can be
used to reason about correctness of implemen-
tations. SC(R)3 incorporates a tool called cord
[3] that takes specially annotated source code
and an SCR specification and checks for the
correspondence between them. cord uses data-
flow analysis instead of exhaustive state enu-
meration to enable effective verification in low-
degree polynomial time. However, the analysis
can sometimes be imprecise, i.e. “there may be
a problem on this line of the code”. In this sec-
tion, we describe how to (correctly) annotate
the code, outline the algorithms used in cord
to check consistency between requirements and
annotated code, and present results of verify-
ing the implementation of the Cruise Control
System.
4.1 Annotations
Code is annotated with special statements
which describe changes in the system state.
These changes involve local (rather than invari-
ant) information and therefore are relatively
easy to specify. The annotations, described in
detail in [3], are of three types. Initial anno-
tations indicate the starting states of the pro-
gram. They unconditionally assign values to
variables and correspond to initialization infor-
mation specified in the requirements. Update
annotations assign values to controlled, mon-
SCR Requirements
Specification
CORD
SAC
errorsAnnotated Code
violations
Figure 5: Code analysis with SC(R)3.
itored or mode class variables4. These anno-
tations identify points at which the program
changes its state. Assert annotations assert
that variables have particular values in the cur-
rent system state. This makes our analysis
more precise and serves as documentation of
what the developer assumes about the system
at a given point in the program.
Consider the following annotated code frag-
ment, taken from the implementation of the
Cruise Control system:5
if (!vIgnition) {
@@ Assert ~Ignition;
vIgnition = true;
@@ Update Ignition;
vCC = mInactive;
@@ Update CC=Inactive;
}
else {
@@ Assert Ignition;
vIgnition = false;
@@ Update ~Ignition;
vCC = mOff;
@@ Update CC=Off;
}
4Monitored and controlled variables have boolean
values; mode class variables have values which form
enumerated types whose constant values are modes of
the mode classes.
5Lines that start with @@ indicate annotations.
In this fragment, code variables vIgnition
and vCC correspond to requirements variables
Ignition and CC. In the Then branch of the
If statement we assert that Ignition is false,
register that Ignition becomes true, marked
by an Update annotation, and then change the
mode of the system to Inactive. This is also
marked by an Update annotation. The Else
branch is similar.
As stated above, cord uses annotations and
control-flow information of the code to check
it for correctness. That is, “the analysis is
as good as the annotations”. Although anno-
tations are easy to insert, we found ourselves
frequently making mistakes, and also noticed
that code maintenance greatly reduces the cor-
respondence between the code and the annota-
tions. Thus, the SC(R)3 toolset includes a tool
called sac [5] designed to check that the code
is annotated correctly. To use the tool, the
programmer creates a list of correspondences
between variables in the requirements and the
code. For example, the following is the speci-
fication of correspondences for the above code
fragment:
correspondences:
{Ignition} -> {vIgnition};
{CC} -> {vCC};
These correspondences can be one-to-one
(one requirements variable corresponds to one
code variable), one-to-many (one requirements
variable corresponds to several code variables),
and many-to-one. sac ensures that an assign-
ment to (a check of) a code variable is always
followed by an Update (an Assert) of an ap-
propriate requirements variable. The entire
process of code verification with SC(R)3 is de-
picted in Figure 5. Here, tools (sac and cord)
and artifacts are represented by ellipses and
boxes, respectively.
4.2 Analysis
Analysis done by cord is described in detail
elsewhere [3]. In this section, we give a quick
summary of this process.
cord checks that transitions implemented in
the code are exactly the same as those spec-
ified in the requirements. These checks corre-
spond to three types of properties: (1) the code
and the specification start out in the same ini-
tial state; (2) the code implements all speci-
fied transitions; and (3) the code implements
only specified transitions. Properties of types
(2) and (3) are called ALT (“all legal transi-
tions”) and OLT (“only legal transitions”), re-
spectively. For example, cord checks an ALT
property that a transition from mode Cruise
to mode Off on event @F(Ignition) exists in
the code. This transition refers to the fourth
row of Table 4. One of the OLT properties is
“the only transitions into mode Off are from
mode Inactive on event @F(Ignition), or
from mode Cruise on event @F(Ignition), or
from mode Override on event @F(Ignition)”.
Verification is done via static analysis of the
annotated code. A technique similar to con-
stant propagation is used to create a finite-state
abstraction of the annotations and control-flow
program statements of the program. We use
an aggressive state-folding strategy aimed at
minimizing the number of states. This number
is bound above by the number of annotations
and control-flow structures in the code and is
almost not affected by the number of variables
in the specification. After the model has been
created, we check it for consistency with the
specification. Typically, the properties involve
fairly short (2-3 states) fragments of the paths
through the code, thus enabling very efficient
checking. In addition, cord can verify invari-
ant and reachability properties, find unreach-
able states, and check that environmental as-
sumptions are not violated in the code.
Fast and highly scalable processing comes
at a price of inexact verification. Abstraction
used in cord leads to computing more behav-
iors than can be present in the code. Thus,
OLT properties and invariants are checked pes-
simistically, i.e., some violations that are not
present in the code can be reported. ALT and
reachability properties are checked optimisti-
cally, i.e., some violations in the code can be
overlooked. We believe that cord should be
used as a debugging rather than a verification
tool and found it to be extremely effective in
discovering errors (see Section 4.3).
Figure 6: Summary of errors.
We had to resort to annotating code be-
cause our analysis techniques could only handle
simple operations on booleans and enumerated
types. A next generation of cord is currently
being developed. For finite types, this version
of the tool will be able to handle more interest-
ing operations, like addition and comparison.
Figure 7: ALT errors.
It will also be able to approximate infinite types
and perform operations on them using abstract
interpretation [8]. This will allow us to analyze
code directly rather than using annotations.
4.3 Checking the Cruise Control
System
We have implemented the Cruise Control sys-
tem in C with an Xlib interface. The implemen-
tation was not originally annotated and con-
sisted of 675 lines of code, out of which roughly
380 lines were used to implement the GUI of the
system. The code was then annotated by an-
other member of the group in about 40 minutes;
the annotation effort was trivial and resulted in
37 Update, 25 Assert and 1 Initial annotation.
After fixing annotation errors reported by
sac, we ran cord on the code of the Cruise
Control system. The analysis took 7.62 sec-
onds (3.45 user, 0.74 system, as reported by
tshell’s time command) on a moderately loaded
SPARCstation-4 (85 MHz processor) with 64
megabytes of RAM, and resulted in reporting
14 ALT and 5 OLT violations (see Figure 6).
The ALT and the OLT violations are shown in
Figures 7 and 8, respectively.
One OLT and one ALT violation were caused
by an incorrect annotation overlooked by sac.
sac does not consider values of variables when
checking code for correct annotations, and did
not report a violation when we annotated an
assignment with Accel instead of ∼Accel. An-
other pair of OLT and ALT violations came
from an incorrect transition in the code (line
388) – to mode Override instead of Cruise.
In addition, cord computed that the system
can be in all possible modes before this line,
whereas only Cruise is possible. This problem
arises because of the imprecise analysis used
in cord and can be fixed by adding an ex-
tra Assert annotation. A yet another pair of
OLT and ALT violations came from a transi-
tion from Override to Cruise. The code did
not check that this transition is only enabled
when Toofast, Brake and Accel are false. Out
of the remaining two OLT violations, one was a
false negative and the second was an incorrect
triggering event for the variable ThrottleOff.
All other ALT properties came from transitions
that were not implemented in the code.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented SC(R)3 – an inte-
grated toolset for specification and reasoning
about tabular requirements. Through a uni-
fied interface, SC(R)3 allows to check software
requirements for correctness and analyze con-
sistency between annotated code and require-
ments. We are currently working on develop-
ing support for automatic code generation and
are looking into ways of using SCR for gener-
ation of black-box test cases. We believe that
SC(R)3 is an important step towards increas-
ing usability of formal methods: it attempts to
replace free-form reasoning in logic by easy to
write and review structured tables and amor-
tizes the cost of creation of formal requirements
through multiple automated analysis activities.
We envision the following methodology for us-
ing SC(R)3:
1. A (human) requirements designer provides
an SCR tabular specification of the sys-
tem’s required behavior and a set of global
properties that should be satisfied by the
system.
Figure 8: OLT errors.
2. SC(R)3 automatically translates the SCR
specification into the input to a model-
checker, verifies properties and translates
counter-examples into the SCR notation.
3. Once the specification is considered cor-
rect, SC(R)3 generates an implementation
of the mode logic and stubs for interface
code, which are filled in by a human de-
veloper.
4. Using the specification, SC(R)3 generates
test cases. Although the mode logic is cor-
rect by construction, interface is likely to
need testing.
5. The resulting implementation is analyzed
for performance and optionally manually
fine-tuned.
6. If manual fine-tuning was used, the code is
automatically checked for consistency with
its specifications.
7. Once the problems pointed out by the
analysis are fixed, the code is tested us-
ing (a subset of) test cases generated in
step (4) above.
In Figure 9, analysis activities performed
within SC(R)3 and software artifacts are shown
inside ellipses and boxes, respectively. For ex-
ample, the code generation activity takes SCR
requirements as an input and generates an im-
plementation in C. A dashed line signifies that
the generated code and the code that is ana-
lyzed for correctness, represent the same arti-
fact.
In SC(R)3, requirements analysis is done via
model-checking. Although model-checking is
an effective verification technique which can be
used without any user input, it has a num-
ber of limitations. Checking can often be pro-
hibitively expensive and cannot usually be ap-
plied to infinite-state systems. Thus, we are
limited to verifying just control (as opposed
to data or timing) aspects of the specification.
In order to use model-checking effectively, we
had to reduce the expressive power of our in-
put logic, which may not be feasible for many
applications. We recognize that more sophis-
ticated verification might be necessary and are
planning to experiment with using a theorem-
prover, e.g. PVS [18], to check complex type-
checking and timing properties of systems.
Code verification in SC(R)3 is done via a
static-analysis tool cord. Although effective
in finding errors in our case studies, cord is
still a prototype tool in need of major improve-
ments. We are currently redesigning it to pro-
SCR Requirements
Test case
Generation
Test CasesC Code
Requirements
Analysis
Code
Generation
Code Analysis
Annotated Code
Figure 9: Pictorial description of activities that can be performed with SC(R)3.
cess a more expressive annotation language and
reason about infinite-domain variables. This
would make cord able to verify implementa-
tions of unrestricted SCR specifications.
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